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Modern Imperialism in Crimea and the
Donbas
JULIUS BODIE*

The diplomatic crises that have enveloped Ukraine since early 2014
threaten to transform the global political and legal order that materialized
in the aftermath of Soviet Russia’s dissolution. The unpredictable pattern
of Russian foreign policy has resulted in the first forcible annexation of a
sovereign European territory since World War II and the perpetuation of
a ‘hybrid war’ in Eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, where pro-Russian
separatists have sought to reunite swathes of captured territory as part of
Novorossya.1 Both of these developments can be traced to legacy Soviet
influences that are embodied in President Vladimir Putin’s aggressive
foreign policy. However, the style and characterization of military action
throughout the conflicts differ in each case. While the first conflict in
Crimea involved an overt Russian military presence securing a bloodless,
diplomatic circumvention of international law that has since been decried
by the Western world, the conflict in the Donbas has been characterized
as a hybrid war, involving a high volume of casualties and disputed
reports of state sponsorship and participation that allow Russia to
maintain plausible deniability about its true involvement.
Although the historical relationship among Ukraine, Crimea, and
Russia is incredibly nuanced and complex in the years since Catherine
the Great first annexed the peninsula in 1783, the current governing State
treaties, customary international law, and domestic constitutions quite
clearly undermine any legitimate basis for Russia’s forcible annexation

*J.D., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Special thanks to Professor David Glazier and the
devoted staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review.
1. THOMAS D. GRANT, AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE: TERRITORY, RESPONSIBILITY,
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). See also Ivan Nechepurenko, Death of
Novorossia: Why the Kremlin Abandoned Ukraine Separatist Project, THE MOSCOW TIMES (May
25, 2015), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/death-of-novorossia-why-kremlinabandoned-ukraine-separatist-project/522320.html.
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of Crimea in March 2014.2 In spite of Moscow’s claims detailing
Crimea’s purported historical right of self-determination, the annexation
has been condemned by several world leaders and supranational legal
bodies.3 The Russian-backed separatist movements in the Donbas region
of Eastern Ukraine, including the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic
(LNR) and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), have recently stalled
in the achievement of their goals, with neither the Kiev government nor
the separatist forces clearly in control of the disputed territories. It has
been difficult to gauge the legality of this separatist movement; various
media accounts have labeled it as a ‘civil war,’ ‘hybrid war,’ ‘rebellion,’
and ‘anti-terrorist operation.’4 The situation in the Donbas is much more
complex than Crimea – the territory is larger, the support for Russia
among the population is lower, and there are no large military bases from
which to launch operations. By perpetuating this quagmire, Putin has
effectively destabilized Ukraine while undermining the legitimacy of
President Poroshenko’s regime and maintaining a high degree of
deniability about Russian influence over the separatists. The mere
presence of the frozen conflict in the Donbas renders it impossible for a
truly whole Ukraine, with internationally recognized boundaries, to
conduct itself as a sovereign polity.
This note will seek to analyze and compare the legality of Russian
involvement in these two crises in Ukraine under the guiding principles
of customary international law, State treaties, diplomatic pacts and
domestic constitutions. In Part I, the annexation of Crimea will be shown
to be illegitimate. Under at least two fundamental UN doctrines, six State
treaties and diplomatic agreements, and three domestic constitutions,
Russia’s actions appear to be a violation of Ukraine’s territorial
sovereignty, as well as an illegal use of force.
While the stalemate in the Donbas region is currently characterized
as a “non-international armed conflict”, this paper will seek to
demonstrate that in two periods of hostilities (August 2014 and January
2015), Russian military actions constituted an illegal use of force, and

2. Adam Taylor, To understand Crimea, take a look back at its complicated history, WASH.
POST (Feb. 27, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/02/27/tounderstand-crimea-take-a-look-back-at-its-complicated-history.
3. Brad Simpson, Self-Determination in the Age of Putin, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 21, 2014),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/21/self-determination-in-the-age-of-putin.
4. Bohdan Harasymiw, Harasymiw on War in Ukraine: Undeclared, Unacknowledged and
Unabated, UKRAINE TRUTH (Feb. 4, 2015), http://ukrainian-studies.ca/2015/01/29/bohdanharasymiw-war-ukraine-undeclared-unacknowledged-unabated.
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perhaps even initiated an international armed conflict.5 The style of
military action has differed in the Donbas from that in Crimea, however,
and Part II will consider whether Russia violated international use of
force and law of armed conflict standards with their actions in Illovaisk
in August 2014 and Debaltseve in January 2015. While Moscow has
officially denied responsibility for the actions of the separatists, evidence
will show that there has been an overt Russian presence conducting
military operations against the government forces of Ukraine.
The fact that the annexation of Crimea was completed in March
2014 allows for a more complete legal analysis than the on-going war in
the Donbas. It was not until nearly a year after the annexation that
President Putin admitted there was a Russian Special Forces operation
ordered weeks in advance of the referendum.6 The war in the Donbas
continues today and has taken the lives of over 3,500 Ukrainian
servicemen and 2,300 civilians.7 It thus does not offer analysts the same
benefit; the conflict must be viewed under a shroud of Russian denial by
using evidence pulled from social media, journalists on the ground, and
reports filed by international organizations. This article will offer an
evaluation of the legality of Russian foreign policy under international
law and seek to illuminate the potential repercussions on security and
global stability effectuated by the first eighteen months of RussoUkrainian hostilities.
I. UKRAINE AND RUSSIA: A COMPLICATED PAST
A brief history of the longstanding relationship between Ukraine
and Russia is required to be able to fully understand the complex geoethnic factors driving these conflicts. The strategic Crimean Peninsula
has been a geopolitical focal point of European empires for centuries. The
eastern oblasts (provinces) of Ukraine, Donetsk and Luhansk, sit on the
Donets River Basin and are notable for their large coal reserves.8 The
region was once a part of the 18th century imperial Russian territory

5. Red Cross officially declares Ukraine civil war, THE LOC. (Jul. 23, 2014, 5:09 PM CT),
http://www.thelocal.ch/20140723/red-cross-declares-civil-war-in-ukraine.
6. Putin reveals secrets of Russia’s Crimea takeover plot, BBC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31796226.
7. See U.N. Report, Escalation of hostilities has exacerbated civilian suffering, OFFICE OF
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Mar. 15, 2017) http://www.ohchr.org/EN
/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21383&LangID=E.
8. The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, Donets Basin, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
(Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.britannica.com/place/Donets-Basin.
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known as Novorossiya, which stretched to the Black Sea.9 The history
between the two nations dates back to the 1654 Treaty of Pereiaslav, and
since then Ukraine has only enjoyed statehood independent from Russia
during periods of war or revolution – e.g., the final days of World War I
in the wake of the 1917 Russian Revolution, and then in the period
surrounding the dissolution of the USSR.10
The Hetmanate was a 17th century militocracy that at its peak
encompassed about half of modern Ukraine as well as parts of Russia and
Poland. Although it was crushed by the Russian Empire, the Cossack
warriors who defended Ukraine’s independence left behind a distinctive
folklore and Ukrainian identity.11 The process, which created the borders
of modern Ukraine, was a result of Russian geopolitical expansion in the
18th and 19th centuries. Tsarist Russia consistently warred with the
Ottoman Empire from its territory on the north coast of the Black Sea.12
In 1783, Catherine the Great declared she was protecting ethnic Russians
in Crimea from the Ottoman Empire and annexed the territory.13 Through
war, colonization, and the ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population, the
Crimean peninsula became a vital part of the Russian empire.
In the early decades of the 19th century, the Tsar set up a university
in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev to develop Ukrainian nationalism in order
to reduce Polish influence in the region.14 Instead, it led to the emergence
of a nationalist revolutionary fervor that subsequently attracted severe
persecution from the Tsar.15 The students at the University of Kiev
played a significant role in these movements, so in the late 19th century
the Russian government prohibited Ukrainian from being spoken by

9. Christian Caryl, Novorossiya is Back From the Dead, FOREIGN POLICY (Apr. 17, 2014),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/17/novorossiya-is-back-from-the-dead.
10. Charles Emmerson, Ukraine and Russia’s History Wars, HIST. TODAY (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://www.historytoday.com/charles-emmerson/ukraine-and-russia’s-history-wars; see also
OF
UKRAINE
(2001)
Pereiaslav
Treaty
of
1654,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CP%5CE%5CPereiaslav
Treatyof1654.htm.
11. Katya Gorchinskaya, Revolutions Without Benefits, THE AM. INT. (Dec. 1, 2015),
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/12/01/revolutions-without-benefits.
12. Emmerson, supra note 10 at 3.
13. Christopher Spencer, Ukraine Crimea Crisis: The History, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 4,
2014), http://guardianlv.com/2014/03/ukraine-crimea-crisis-the-history.
14. David Keys, Complex Crimea: the history behind the relationship between Russia and
Ukraine over Crimea, BBC HIST. MAG. (May 2011), http://www.historyextra.com/feature/
complex-crimea-history-relationship-Russia-Ukraine-Crimea.
15. Richard Antony French, Kiev, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Dec. 2015),
http://www.britannica.com/place/Kiev.
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teachers in the classroom and banned educational, scholarly, and
religious publications in Ukrainian.16
The European powers of the mid-19th century, led by Britain, feared
continued Russian expansion east, particularly now that they had a major
naval base in Sevastopol on the Black Sea.17 In response, they attempted
to shore up the Ottoman Empire’s buffer zone between Western Europe
and Russia by closing the Bosporus and Dardanelles to all warships (and
thus closing access to the Mediterranean).18 This sparked the 1854
Crimean War, where the Anglo-French-Ottoman force destroyed
Sevastopol and humiliated Tsar Nicholas’ army.19 Although the key port
towns of Crimea were returned to Russia, the peace agreement
established that Russia would not maintain any naval or military bases on
Black Sea, greatly weakening Russia as a threat to the Ottomans or
Western Europe.20
World War I was devastating for Russia. Of the nearly 10 million
troops mobilized, over a third were wounded or killed.21 After a period
of mass surrenders and desertions, the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of
1917 overtook the incompetent tsarist regime and the Provisional
Government that followed the Tsar’s abdication. While the fledgling
Bolshevik government engaged in peace negotiations with Germans, in
Ukraine, a “governing council” known as the Rada was having trouble
with the local Bolshevik movement.22 Germany, with forces near the
region, acted first and effectuated the authority of the Rada by supplying
food and aid to its supporters.23 Germany then forced the Bolshevik
government to sign a treaty that recognized the independence of
Ukraine.24 German forces entered Kiev in March 1918 and proclaimed
Ukraine to be a sovereign State.25 Yet soon after, Imperial Germany
collapsed, and a civil war engulfed much of Russia, with Crimea
changing hands several times over the next three years.26 In 1921, the
16. Id. See also Walter G. Moss, The 20 Things You Need to Know to Understand What’s
Happening in Ukraine, HIST. NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 28, 2014), http://historynewsnetwork.org/
article/155451.
17. William R. Polk, What’s Behind the Conflict between Russia and Ukraine?, HIST. NEWS
NETWORK (Dec. 21, 2014), http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/157941.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 8.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 9.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was established and the autonomous
Crimean Republic was recognized as a homeland for the Crimean Tatars;
both officially as part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
(RSFSR).27 However, western Ukraine became part of the newly
constructed state of Poland.28
The darkest period of Ukrainian history may have been the 1930s
when Soviet leader Joseph Stalin orchestrated mass executions and
perpetuated a state-induced famine, known as the Holodomor, which
killed as many as ten million people.29 Afterward, millions of Russians
and other nationalities were forcibly transported to repopulate the
resource-rich eastern regions.30 Consequently, World War II was critical
for Ukraine as it served as a buffer zone between the German Wehrmacht
and the Russian heartland.31 Nearly one-sixth of the Ukrainian population
died during the war, totaling over 5.3 million.32 When the Nazis and
Soviets divided Poland in 1939, they reunited Western Ukraine with
Eastern Ukraine.33 This agreement eventually fueled Ukraine’s later
desire for nationhood.34
During the war, Ukraine was a prime economic target of Germany
as the “bread basket” of Russia.35 When the Germans captured Kiev, they
siphoned off food and shipped 2.5 million Ukrainians to German slave
labor camps.36 Stalin also ordered the deportation of the 200,000 Muslim
Crimean Tartars.37 Tens of thousands of ethnic Russians were then settled
on the peninsula.38 At this point, while geographically considered an
extension of Ukraine, the ethnopolitical ties of Crimea were
overwhelming with Russia. In the closing days of WWII, Stalin chose
Yalta in Crimea as the place for the Allies to redraw the map of Europe.39
Less than a decade later, Ukraine-born USSR leader Nikita Khrushchev
27. See Serhy Yekelchyk, The Ukrainian Crisis: In Russia’s Long Shadow, OHIO ST. U.
ORIGINS (Jun. 2014), http://origins.osu.edu/article/ukrainian-crisis-russias-long-shadow. See also
Keys, supra note 14.
28. See Moss, supra note 16, at 5.
29. See Theunis Bates, Ukraine’s Fraught Relationship with Russia: A Brief History, THE
WK. (Mar. 8, 2014), http://theweek.com/articles/449691/ukraines-fraught-relationship-russiabrief-history; See also Moss, supra note 16.
30. See Bates, supra note 27.
31. See Polk, supra note 17.
32. Id.
33. See Yekelchyk, supra note 25.
34. Id.
35. See Polk, supra note 17.
36. Id.
37. See Keys, supra note 14.
38. See Yekelchyk, supra note 25.
39. See Polk, supra note 17.
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transferred Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Satellite Republic in
celebration of the anniversary of the 1654 Pereiaslav Treaty.40 At the
time, it was impossible to know that Ukraine’s borders would one day
become sovereign international borders.
Geo-ethnic factions could still be seen in the makeup of the country
with the formal dissolution of the USSR in 1991 and recognition of
Ukraine’s declaration of independence.41 The western part of Ukraine
leaned towards the European Union, whereas the industrial southeast
consisted of Russian-speaking pro-communist factions of nostalgic
Kremlin supporters.42 In its brief period of post-Soviet independence,
Ukraine has been wrought with political corruption and a comprehensive
need for economic reform. Ethnic and political tensions have perpetuated
several regime changes, particularly in the past decade as pro-Russia and
pro-European regimes seemingly exchanged places in Kiev.
In spite of the growing desire for European integration in Ukraine
in the early 2000s, pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych (born in
Soviet Ukraine’s Donetsk oblast) won the 2004 presidential election.43
However, reports of massive election fraud and rigged ballots spurred
mass protests in Kiev and other major western cities in what came to be
known as the Orange Revolution.44 Viktor Yuschenko, a pro-European
candidate who had been the victim of an attempted assassination via
poisoning during the election campaign won the second monitored
election run-off.45 Putin openly sided with the defeated regime in the
aftermath of the Orange Revolution, perpetuating the imperial Russian
past and further dividing Ukraine’s eastern and western factions.46 The
failure of the subsequent pro-West leaders resulted in Yanukovych’s
comeback, and in 2010 he was elected president.47
The key to this complex history is that there are two competing
narratives of the Russo-Ukrainian imperial rise and fall: a distinct,
differing Ukrainian view and a Russian view. To Russia, Ukraine has
lost perspective of the two countries’ shared history and no longer

40. See Spencer, supra note 13.
41. See Yekelchyk, supra note 25.
42. Id.
43. See Stuart Williams, Ukraine’s ‘Orange Villain’ seeks last laugh, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan.
12, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/6973451/Ukraines-Orange-villain-seekslast-laugh.html.
44. Id.
45. Id. See also Yuschenko and the poison theory, BBC NEWS (Dec. 11, 2004),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4041321.stm.
46. See Yekelchyk, supra note 25.
47. Id.
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cherishes their supporting role in Russia’s greatness.48 Ukrainians have
embraced a narrative based in national independence and resistance to
imperial domination by Moscow. While the 1939 incorporation of
Western Ukraine into the Soviet Union is seen by Russia to be a
reunification of a lost territory, Ukrainian nationalists see it more as the
beginning of a 50-year Soviet occupation that ended in 1991.49 With this
nuanced history in mind, the last few years of political and military crises
can now be analyzed in detail.
II. RUSSIA’S ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA
A. Background
Several major events prefaced the 2014 annexation of Crimea that
will help shed light on Russia’s reasons for violating Ukraine’s territorial
sovereignty. In November 2013, public support began to grow for antigovernment protests throughout western Ukraine, with the most public
demonstrations occurring in the capital city of Kiev at Maidan
Nezalezhonsti or “Independence Square.”50 The pro-Moscow President
Yanukovych had a longstanding history of corruption, repression and
anti-Western policies which stood at odds with Ukrainian popular
sentiment.51 When he refused to sign a Trade Association Agreement
with the European Union that would create closer economic ties between
Ukraine and Western Europe, protests in Kiev grew larger, more radical
in opposition to the regime, and eventually more violent.52 On February
20, 2014, these protests reached a boiling point as eighty-eight people
were killed in forty-eight hours, including some by uniformed snipers
shooting protestors from rooftops.53
Two days later, President
Yanukovych fled Ukraine after protest leaders and other members of the
Ukrainian political elite agreed to form a new government and hold fresh
elections.54
48. See Emmerson, supra note 10.
49. Id.
50. See Adam Taylor, Why Ukraine is So Important, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 28, 2014),
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-ukraine-is-so-important-2014-1.
51. See Maxim Tucker, Ukraine pro-EU protests: ‘It’s not a rally, it’s a revolution’, THE IND.
(Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-pro-eu-protests-policeforced-to-flee-as-demonstrators-take-over-central-kiev-8975954.html.
52. See Lizzie Dearden, Ukraine Crisis: A timeline of the conflict from the Euromaidan
protests to MH17 and civil war in the east, THE IND. (Sept. 2, 2014), http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-a-tim. . .-the-euromaidan-protests-tomh17-and-civil-war-in-the-9706999.html.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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On March 16, 2014, a referendum on the status of the Ukrainian
territory of Crimea was held.55 Two choices were proffered to the citizens
of Crimea: either restore the 1992 Crimean constitution and its status as
a territory of Ukraine, or formally sever ties to Kiev and join the Russian
Federation.56 According to the Russian state media, voter turnout was
81.3%, and 96.7% of the votes were cast in favor of annexation by
Russia.57 Within three days, President Putin signed an Executive Order
recognizing an autonomous Republic of Crimea, and concluded a treaty
on the accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation.58
The conflict was spurred by the so called “Euromaidan” (referencing the
protests in Kiev’s Maidan Square) and the preceding months of protests
leading to a change of regime in Kiev.59
On February 27, pro-Russian militias seized government
headquarters and parliament in Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula, raising the
Russian flag over two buildings in the capital city, Simferopol.60
Throughout the next week, armed men in military uniform, lacking any
insignia (referred to as “little green men” by Western press and the “polite
men” by Putin) made their presence known throughout key Crimean
cities, government buildings, and airports.61 The Kremlin initially denied
the presence of overt Russian military, but as masked gunmen surrounded
Ukrainian military installations and administrative buildings, it became
more difficult for Russian authorities to maintain any plausible
deniability of involvement. At the time, Moscow referred to the
paramilitary presence as “self-defense” groups, but later Putin admitted
that there was indeed Russian Special Forces acting in an operational
capacity.62 Some of these soldiers were already present at the naval base
in Sevastopol under previous basing agreements. However, they were

55. See Grant, supra note 1, at 19.
56. Id. at 16.
57. Id. at 17-18.
58. Id. at 19-20.
59. Dearden, supra note 50.
60. See Heather Saul, Ukraine crisis: Armed men hoist Russian flag after seizing Crimea
Parliament, THE IND. (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukrainecrisis-armed-men-hoist-russian-flag-after-seizing-crimea-parliament-9156413.html.
61. Vitaly Shevchenko, “Little Green men” or “Russia invaders”?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 11,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154.
62. Aleksander Vasovic & Mike Colle-White, Crimea prepares for referendum under heavy
military presence, REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/15/usukraine-crisis-crimea-idUSBREA2E09R20140315#hWXScmfuR1XFKkOx.97; Putin reveals
secrets of Russia’s Crimea takeover plot, BBC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-31796226.
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deployed throughout the territory and seized effective control of the
region by the time of the referendum.63
B. Annexation
The day after the referendum was held, the Russian President passed
an executive order that recognized “the Republic of Crimea as a
sovereign and independent state, whose city of Sevastopol has a special
status.”64 On March 18, he announced the “Crimean State Council” and
the “Sevastopol Legislative Assembly” had proposed joining the Russian
Federation, and signed an executive order titled “On Executing the
Agreement on Admission of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian
Federation.” 65 On March 19, a bill “On Accession of the Republic of
Crimea to the Russian Federation and the Creation of New Constitution
Entities within Russia” was submitted to the State Duma, the lower house
of the Russian legislature.66 The annexation was formalized in Russian
law in the Federal Constitution on March 21, 2014.67
No domestic Ukrainian law or treaty between Russia and Ukraine
allowed for a transfer of territory; no negotiation occurred between the
State governments or the putative authorities of Crimea; and Ukraine did
not accede to any separation of Crimea from its territory.68 In fact, the
Ukrainian parliament formally declared the referendum to be void and
legally invalid.69 Since that time, Crimea’s annexation has been decried
by multiple international organizations (e.g., The Council of Europe,
European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
NATO, UN General Assembly), nearly all of Europe, and the United
States.70 The proceeding analysis will explain how this annexation was a
violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and an illegal use of force under
various UN doctrines, customary international law, international treaties,
and domestic constitutions.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See Grant, supra note 1, at 7.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 17.
Jari Tanner, Europe lawmakers condemn Russian action in Crimea, Ukraine,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 9, 2015), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/1786f6bca6eb4e4b99e45
81034e5ffd0/europe-lawmakers-condemn-russian-actions-crimea-ukraine.
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C. UN Doctrines
The internationally recognized guidelines for the use of force can be
found in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The UN Charter was agreed
upon in the immediate aftermath of World War II and was intended to be
a foundational treaty governing relations between States.71 Article 2(4)
is the governing principle for the use of force, requiring all members to
“refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”72
The presence of masked militia and deployment of thousands of troops
in the sovereign territory of another State, on the eve of a critical political
referendum, thus appears to be in violation of the type of force prohibited
in Article 2(4).
In 1970, a UN General Assembly Resolution, the Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations was passed, affirming the vital Charter principles of territorial
sovereignty and respect of State boundaries.73 After Russia vetoed the
UN Security Council draft resolution denouncing the annexation, the UN
General Assembly considered the conflict.74 The General Assembly
referred to the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations in their nonbinding resolution published March 27, 2014 entitled “Territorial
integrity of Ukraine.”75 The 1970 resolution is recognized as a
fundamental source of international law, and the 2014 resolution
reaffirmed that
“the territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by another
State resulting from the threat or use of force, and that any attempt
aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and
territorial integrity of a State or country or of its political independence
is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter.”76

71. U.N. Charter, art. 2, ¶ 4, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf.
72. Id.
73. Sergey Sayapin, The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 68/262 In the Context
of General International Law, 2 EUR. POL. & L. DISCOURSE VOL 19, 19 (2015)
http://www.academia.edu/11807900/The_United_Nations_General_Assembly_Resolution_
68_262_in_the_Context_of_General_International_Law.
74. See generally Backing Ukraine’s territorial integrity, UN Assembly declares Crimea
referendum invalid, UN NEWS CENTRE (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsID=47443#.Vle6x9AqhAQ.
75. See Sayapin, supra note 69, at 26.
76. Id. at 23.
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Although UN General Assembly resolutions are not binding, they
reflect existing customary international norms or treaty law.77
Additionally, though the UN Charter dictates that the Security Council
bears the “primary responsibility” for maintaining international peace
and security, UN Security Council member, Russia, is currently a direct
participant in the conflict.78 Thus, the General Assembly’s consideration
of the Crimea issue may hold more legal significance, particularly as it
appears to be focused on reaffirming existing principles of State
sovereignty.79 Again, Russia’s actions in Crimea seem to fit into this
prohibited category of “use of force” aimed at the “disruption of national
unity and territorial integrity of a State.”
The crime of aggression was not initially codified into the UN
Charter in 1945 because member States had trouble agreeing on a
definition or conditions of “aggression,” since no such crime existed at
the time the Charter was drafted.80 In 1974, General Assembly
Resolution 3314 on the Definition of Aggression was passed, and it
included “…any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another
State or part thereof.”81 While aggression was listed as a crime in the
1998 Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court,
the 1974 definition of aggression was not codified into the Statute until
2010 at a review conference in Kampala.82 Both the Russian Federation
and Ukraine are signatories to the earlier treaty, but are not parties to the
updated 2010 articles.83 Article 8 bis of the updated Rome Statute
referred to the 1974 GAR 3314 to help define crimes of aggression,
including using its explicit language in section 2(a), which mandates that
States refrain from “any military occupation, however temporary,…or
any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State.”84
However, the crime of aggression cannot be a charge levied against
Russia as it is not yet a State party to the updated procedural language.
Although it is unclear how a “crime of aggression” will be fully
prosecuted, and could not be done so until after 2017, the newly
77. Id. at 20.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Grant, supra note 1, at 12.
81. Id. at 12.
82. The Crime of Aggression, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT.,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression (last visited Dec. 2015).
83. See generally The Rome Statute in the World, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT. (Nov.
10, 2011), https://www.iccnow.org/documents/signatory_chart_Nov_2011_EN.pdf.
84. ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, art. 8 bis 2(a) (2010),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/add16852-aee9-4757-abe79cdc7cf02886/283503/romestatuteng1.pdf.
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incorporated crime of aggression cannot apply to Russia as it currently
stands today.85 Thus, while the use of force in Crimea does appear to
violate Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the non-binding 1974
definition of aggression, Russia does not appear to be liable for a crime
aggression as it is currently defined. However, this does not legitimatize
the violation of territorial sovereignty or use of force that the UN General
assembly condemned.
D. State Treaties, Diplomatic Pacts, and International Agreements
Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula is a demonstrable
violation of several major international treaties and agreements to which
the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation were signatories: the 1975
Helsinki Accords and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe Final Act; the 1991 Belavezha Accords; the 1994 Budapest
Memorandum; the Statute of the Council of Europe (which Russia joined
in 1996); the 1997 bilateral Treaty of Friendship; and the 1997 Partition
Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet. Each of these
pacts emphasized respect of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty in one form
or another, and each was violated by Russia’s political and military
actions in Crimea in March 2014.
Both Ukraine and Russia are signatories to the Final Act of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), adopted as
part of the 1975 Helsinki Accords.86 The act sought to promote the Cold
War era policy of détente between East and West, and outlined vital
principles of European State sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, and
noninterference in the domestic affairs of other states.87 It mandated that
States shall refrain from “any demand for, or act of, seizure and
usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.”88
Signed by thirty-five countries, the accord was actually seen at the time
as a diplomatic victory for Moscow.89 This is because the agreement
appeared to legitimize Soviet suzerainty across Eastern Europe and
prevented any prospective challenge to its vast territorial borders.
However, the Helsinki Accords now sanctify post-Cold War borders and
85. See generally The Crime of Aggression, supra note 78.
86. Spencer Kimball, Bound by Treaty: Russia, Ukraine, and Crimea, DEUTSCHE WELLE
(Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.dw.com/en/bound-by-treaty-russia-ukraine-and-crimea/a-17487632.
87. Brian Whitmore, RIP Helsinki Accords, RADIO FREE EUR. (Jul. 30, 2015),
http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/27161370.html.
88. Jean-Dominique Giuliani, Russia, Ukraine, and International Law, FOUND. ROBERT
SCHUMAN (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-344en.pdf.
89. Whitmore, supra note 83, at 2.
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protects the inviolability of Moscow’s former satellite states.90 Article IV
of the Accords prohibits States from “making each other’s territory the
object of military occupation, or other direct or indirect measures of
force…no such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legal.”91
Thus, Russia’s military deployment in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea
appears to be a violation of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty and therefore
the Final Act of the Helsinki Accords.
The 1991 Belavezha Accords accompanied the break-up of the
USSR and the creation of the succeeding entity, the Commonwealth of
Independent States.92 The dissolution was prompted by a secret
agreement between the presidents of three out of the fifteen Soviet
republics, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.93 The agreement was conducted
behind the back of the Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, and the
parties agreed to accept and respect the territorial integrity and the
inviolability of each State’s borders.94 President Putin has belittled this
agreement as a betrayal of ethnic Russians, stating that “millions of
Russians went to bed in one country and woke up in another.”95 In
December 1991, eight more former Soviet republics joined the treaty.96
While there is debate about the legal legitimacy of the Accords, as a party
to the agreement, the Russian Federation was in violation of its terms
when its military deployed throughout Crimea and subsequently annexed
the region in March 2014.
In December 1994, a non-nuclear proliferation agreement was
concluded among Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Ukraine97 The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances resulted
in Ukraine yielding possession of its 1,800 nuclear warheads in exchange
for international guarantees of its borders, including Crimea.98 The
agreement prohibited uses of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, all former
90. Id at 3.
91. The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe art. IV, Aug. 1,
1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/osce/basics/finact75.htm.
92. The Belavezha Accords signed, PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY (Dec. 8, 1991),
http://www.prlib.ru/en-us/history/Pages/Item.aspx?itemid=749.
93. See generally Id.
94. Id.
95. See President Vladimir Putin, Address at the Kremlin (Mar. 18, 2014),
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603.
96. See The Belavezha Accords signed, supra note 88.
97. See generally Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances 1994, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Dec. 5, 1994), http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-anddisarmament/budapest-memorandums-security-assurances-1994/p32484.
98. See Giuliani, supra note 84, at 3.
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Soviet republics with a nuclear weapons infrastructure.99 Since the
Budapest Memorandum’s very basis was an “explicit Russian guarantee”
of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, it has been referred to by multiple world
leaders whence condemning Russia’s actions in the Crimea.100 The
agreement called for parties to seek guidance from the UN Security
Council to provide assistance if “Ukraine should become a victim of an
act of aggression;” however, this is clearly an ineffective solution given
Moscow’s position as a veto-wielding permanent member of the Security
Council.101 Russia has blamed the US for violating this agreement by
instigating the Euromaidan “coup” in Ukraine, and has accused
Washington, without evidence, of arming and funding the opposition to
Yanukovych.102 However, in bypassing UN Security Council permission
and annexing sovereign Ukraine territory, Russia’s actions constituted a
violation of the Budapest Memorandum’s main tenets.
In 1996, Russia joined the forty-seven nation Council of Europe, a
body that governs several international courts and assemblies, such as the
European Court of Human Rights.103 At that time, it became a party to
the Statute of the Council of Europe. The organization was founded in
1949, by the Treaty of London, with the goal of unifying European States
to discuss political relations and promote fundamental principles of
human rights and international law.104 The Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe (PACE) is made up of representatives of member
states’ parliaments and a Council of Foreign Ministers. Since its
formation, the Council of Europe has passed over 200 legally binding
European treaties and conventions.105 In January 2015, the Parliamentary
Assembly suspended Russia from participation in the Assembly’s bodies,
citing their violation of the Statute of the Council of Europe and declaring
the annexation of Crimea to be an illegal violation of international law.106
The Assembly referred to the previously discussed UN Charter, the
99. See Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances, 1994, supra note 93
100. Stephen Chase & Mark MacKinnon, Harper leads charge to expel Russia from G8, ramp
up sanctions, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/politics/harper-leads-charge-to-expel-russia-from-g8-ramp-up-sanctions/article17631725.
101. See Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances, 1994, supra note 93.
102. See Andrew Higgins & Peter Baker, Russia Claims U.S. Is Meddling Over Ukraine, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/07/world/europe/ukraine.html?_r=0.
103. Luke Harding, Russia delegation suspended from Council of Europe over Crimea, THE
GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/10/russia-suspendedcouncil-europe-crimea-ukraine.
104. Council of Europe, CIVITAS (2014), http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSINST/
IN7.php.
105. Id.
106. See Giuliani, supra note 84, at 2.
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Helsinki Accords, and the commitments made to the organization when
Russia joined in 1996.107
In 1997, Russia and Ukraine agreed to enter into two bilateral
treaties dealing with another legacy of the Soviet breakup – the
disposition of the Black Sea Fleet that was part of the Soviet Navy and
based in Crimea.108 The first treaty Moscow and Kiev signed was the
‘Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between the Ukraine
and the Russia Federation.’ Article 2 articulated “respect [of] each
other’s territorial integrity” and the “inviolability of the borders” between
them.109 Later that year, the ‘Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions
of the Black Sea Fleet’ was signed, emphasizing the respect of each
State’s borders, including an explicit statement that “Crimea is legally
and territorially a sovereign part of Ukraine.”110 In return, Ukraine
allowed Russia to lease one the largest operational naval bases in the
world in the port city Sevastopol (renewed in 2010 to last until 2042).111
The treaty allowed Russia to maintain up to 25,000 troops, 132 armored
combat vehicles, and 24 pieces of artillery at the facilities on the Crimean
base.112
However, there were also crucial limitations on Russian military
behavior. The military forces could only operate “beyond their
deployment sites” after coordinating with Ukraine’s administrative
agencies.113 Also, the military forces had to “respect the sovereignty of
Ukraine, honor its legislation, and preclude interference in the internal
affairs of Ukraine.”114 One week after the annexation of Crimea, Putin
submitted proposals to the State Duma terminating the legal effect of
several Russo-Ukrainian agreements, including this treaty.115 Russia’s
actions appear to be in direct violation of the 1997 treaty, as Moscow
deployed the Sevastopol-based troops to seize control of crucial Crimean
territory on the eve of a political referendum.116
107. Id.
108. See Tyler Felgenhauer, Ukraine, Russia, and the Black Sea Fleet Accords, DEF.
TECHNICAL INFO. CENTER at 1 (Feb. 26, 1999), http://dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a360381.pdf.
109. See Kimball, supra note 82.
110. See Felgenhauer, supra note 102.
111. See Kimball, supra note 82.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Putin submits proposals on denouncing some Russia-Ukraine agreements on Black Sea
Fleet, TASS (Mar. 28, 2014), http://tass.ru/en/russia/725725.
116. Michael Kofman & Matthew Rojansky, A Closer Look at Russia’s “Hybrid War”,
CABLE
(Apr.
2015),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/7KENNAN
KENNAN%20CABLE-ROJANSKY%20KOFMAN.pdf.
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E. Domestic Constitutions
The Constitution of Ukraine makes explicit references to the
territorial sovereignty of Crimea, the process for referendums of a “local
character,” and the lawful process for proposed changes to border of
Ukraine’s territory.117 Four main articles were violated by the
government of Crimea in conducting a referendum to determine
Ukraine’s territorial boundaries.
Chapter XI of the Constitution addresses the territorial structure of
Ukraine. Article 134 states that the “Autonomous Republic of Crimea is
an inseparable constituent part of Ukraine.”118 Article 135 discusses the
Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and dictates that it
“shall not contradict the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine.”119 Under
Article 138, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was within its rights to
organize and conduct a local referendum.120 However, under Article 73,
any issues that involve “altering the territory of Ukraine are exclusively
solved by an All-Ukrainian referendum.”121 Article 157 prohibits
amendments to the Constitution that violate the “territorial indivisibility”
of Ukraine.122 When the issue was submitted to the Constitutional Court
of Ukraine, they affirmed that only an all-Ukrainian referendum could
address a change to State boundaries.123 The Venice Commission of the
Council of Europe considered the referendum in an opinion, and held that
the Ukrainian Constitution clearly prohibited a local referendum from
altering its territory.124 Thus, the March 2014 referendum to break away
from the Ukraine violated four main tenants of the Ukrainian
Constitution, confirmed in both State Constitutional Court and an
advisory body that specializes in constitutional law.
The Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was also
violated when a local referendum was conducted in a manner inconsistent
with the Constitution of Ukraine. Under Article 28, all statutory acts
passed in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea must conform to the
Constitution of Ukraine.125 The four Articles that were discussed above
were all in direct contradiction to the actions taken by the government of
117. See Grant, supra note 1, at 16.
118. UKR. CONST. art. 134, http://www.infoukes.com/history/constitution/index-en.html#r9.
119. Id. art. 135.
120. Id. at Ch. X Art. 138.
121. Id. at Ch. III Art. 73.
122. Id. at Ch. XIII Art. 157.
123. See Grant, supra note 1, at 16-17.
124. Id. at 17.
125. Venice Commission Opinion No. 762 (2014) at 9 (Mar. 21, 2014),
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD (2014)002-e.
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Crimea. Because it was outside of the local government’s scope of
authority to violate the Ukrainian Constitution, the referendum to change
Ukraine’s boundaries violated the Constitution of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea.126
Russia’s Constitution had dictated since 2001 that the procedure for
admitting a new subject to the Russian Federation was based on a mutual
accord between the Russian Federation and the relevant State, had to take
place pursuant to an international treaty between the two countries, and
be initiated by a request from the foreign State.127 From the way the
Constitution was worded, it would have been problematic to allow
Crimea to accede to the Russian Federation as it was not recognized as
an independent State and the request was not initiated by Ukraine.
However, on February 28, 2014, a bill was introduced to the State Duma,
On Amending the Federal Constitutional Law on the Procedure of
Admission to the Russian Federation and Creation of a New Subject
within the Russian Federation.128 The key amendment within the bill
removed the requirement of “mutual accord” between the Russian
Federation and the foreign state and the conclusion of an international
treaty between two states.129 Once implemented, a foreign State’s
admission would be carried out solely on the basis of the constitutional
law of the Russian Federation.130 Keep in mind, this law was submitted
as Russian military forces are being deployed throughout the territory of
Crimea. Hence, it appears the bill was submitted in a direct attempt to
circumvent existing constitutional barriers in anticipation of the
annexation process.
Yet, under Art. 15(4) of Russia’s Constitution, universally
recognized norms of international law and international treaties
supersede any Russian Federation law that may be contradictory.131
Accordingly, a domestic law voiding the legal process for territorial
acquisitions based in prior treaty agreements between Ukraine and Russia
would not be legitimate in light of its contradictory nature to standing
international law. The Constitution of Ukraine, the Constitution of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the Constitution of the Russian
Federation until late February, 2014 (and possibly after), were thus
126. Id.
127. Venice Commission Opinion No. 763 (2014), at 7 (Mar. 21, 2014),
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD (2014)004-e.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 3.
130. Id. at 3.
ROSSIISKOI
FEDERATSII
[KONST.
RF]
[CONSTITUTION],
131. KONSTITUTSIIA
http://constitution.garant.ru/english.
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violated by both the Crimean and Russian government actions that
resulted in Crimea’s referendum to become a federal subject of Russia.
F. Russia’s Legal Arguments
As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a major
international power, Russia has the ability to shape global interpretations
of international law. Thus, it is significant to attempt to give credence to
the legal rhetoric the Kremlin espoused for their actions in Crimea. Five
of Putin’s legal arguments will be analyzed in turn: (1) the historic right
Russia maintains over Crimea allowed for a referendum to determine a
legitimate vote for the “self-determination” of the Crimean people and
thus was a valid act of unilateral secession;132 (2) the human rights of the
ethno-Russian minority resident in Crimea were threatened by an
oppressive nationalist regime;133 (3) Russia’s intervention was at the legal
invitation of the illegally ousted President Yanukovych and the Prime
Minister of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea;134 (4) there was a
fundamental change of circumstances (rebus sic stantibus) resulting from
a radical military coup that triggered a reexamination of treaty obligations
to Ukraine;135 and (5) based on State practice embodied in the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) Kosovo decision and recent Western
actions in Iraq and Libya, the use of force in Crimea was legitimate.136
While there is some basis in State practice for Russia’s legal position, all
five of these arguments will be shown to be of minimal legitimacy.
G. Self Determination and Secession
The first argument can be further dissected into two parts: that
Russia’s historical right to Crimea legitimized the use of force in aid of
‘self-determination;’ and that the act was thus a valid unilateral ‘remedial
secession.’ The prohibition against the threat or use of force among
States contains limited exceptions embodied in Article 51 of the UN
132. Grant, supra note 1, at 57.
133. Id. at 50.
134. See Roy Allison, Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke
the rules, 90 INT’L AFF. 1255, 1264 (2014).
135. Boris N. Mamlyuk, Mapping Developments in Ukraine from the Perspective of
International Law, CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. (Mar. 12, 2014), http://cjicl.org.uk/
2014/03/12/mapping-developments-ukraine-perspective-international-law.
136. Id.; See also Valerie Pacer, Vladimir Putin’s justification for Russian action in Crimea
undermines his previous arguments over Syria, Libya and Iraq, THE LONDON SCH. OF ECON. &
POL. SCI. (Mar. 11, 2014), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/03/11/vladimir-putinsjustification-for-russian-action-in-crimea-undermines-his-previous-arguments-over-syria-libyaand-iraq.
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Charter, which recognizes the “inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense.”137 The right allows for a group of people to determine their
own independent political, economic, social, and cultural status in limited
scenarios. The two key elements to analyze are the actions of the
incumbent State and the responses of the international community.138
There are two sets of circumstances where the UN Charter dictates selfdetermination can entail a right for the people of a sovereign territory to
establish a new State.139
The first circumstance deals with decolonization regimes and was
expressed through a series of UN General Assembly resolutions in
1960.140 The resolutions declared the subjugation of colonial regimes to
be a denial of fundamental human rights and allowed for a Non-Self
Governing Territory to either declare independence as a State, freely
associated with an independent State, or integrate with an independent
State.141 However, this was limited to “colonial type” territories.142
The other type of “self-determination” is the more controversial act
of unilateral “remedial secession.”143 This is a contested concept, and
even if valid it is considered a right that can only be invoked if the
“incumbent State committed a serious breach of its obligations to the
community,” such as the South African system of apartheid, or the
violation of human rights in Kosovo.144 If the people of a territory are
allowed to participate in government and are not being oppressed
systematically, acts of secession are widely considered illegal.145 In an
advisory opinion by the Canadian Supreme Court on the secession of
Quebec, the Court made clear that because the people of Quebec were not
“denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political,
economic, social and cultural development,” they did not enjoy a right
under international law to effect unilateral secession.146 The Quebec
decision also recognized a process of negotiation required with the
incumbent State before a valid act of separation can occur, to determine
if the issue can be settled under a national process.147
137. U.N. Charter, art. 51, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html.
138. Mamlyuk, supra note 131.
139. Grant, supra note 1, at 23-26.
140. Id. at 23.
141. Id. at 24.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 26.
144. Id. at 27.
145. Mamlyuk, supra note 131.
146. Gaiane Nuridzhanian, Crimean Secession: No Right to Divorce, CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L &
COMP. L. (Mar. 9, 2014), http://cjicl.org.uk/2014/03/09/crimean-secession-right-divorce.
147. Id.
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According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), there was no military or human rights oppression
perpetuated against the people of Crimea by the government in Kiev. 148
This position was confirmed in the April 2014 “Report on the Human
Rights Situation in Ukraine” by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR Report).149 Additionally,
Crimea is not considered a “colonized” territory.150 After the UN Security
Council conducted seven sessions on the situation in Crimea, Russia
vetoed the draft resolution that urged countries not to recognize the
results of the referendum.151 Subsequently, the UN General Assembly
voted 100 to 11 with fifty-eight abstentions on a non-binding resolution
with similar language to the Security Council’s draft, including language
in favor of upholding the integrity of Ukraine’s borders and declaring the
March 2014 referendum invalid.152
The process of the referendum was itself of dubious legitimacy due
to the substantial presence of armed pro-Russian forces replacing the
normal government administration. According to the UN High
Commissioner of Human Rights “the presence of paramilitary and so
called self-defense groups as well as soldiers without insignia… was also
not conducive to an environment in which the will of voters could be
exercised freely.”153 Constitutional referendums that hold enough
significance as to determine State sovereignty are expected to be held in
fair and monitored conditions. If Russia sought a truly legal international
resolution to the process of accepting Crimea as a federal subject to its
territory, the referendum would not have been conducted “in haste, in a
period of public crisis, and in the absence of third party observation.”154
Accordingly, this does not appear to have been a valid act of ‘self
determination’ by Crimea under international law.

148. Developing Situation in Crimea alarming, says OSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities, OSCE.ORG (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.osce.org/hcnm/116180.
149. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the human
rights situation in Ukraine (Apr. 15, 2014), www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/
Ukraine_Report_15April2014.doc.
150. Grant, supra note 1, at 25.
151. Backing Ukraine’s territorial integrity, UN Assembly declares Crimea referendum
invalid, UN NEWS CENTRE (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?
NewsID=47443#.WI6A0LYrLeR.
152. Id.
153. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 144, at 4.
154. Grant, supra note 1, at 57.
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H. Human Rights
Another popular Russian argument was based on the protection of
co-ethnic Russians in Ukraine. In response to the Kiev regime change,
Putin stated that “those who opposed the coup were immediately
threatened with repression. Naturally, the first in line here was
Crimea…we could not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress.”155
Russian UN representative Vitaly Churkin asserted that “extremists in
Ukraine must be prevented from taking control of the situation through
illegitimate means, the use of violence and open terror.”156 However, as
stated above, according to both the OSCE and the OHCHR Report, there
has been little documented evidence of any form of oppression of the
Crimean Russian ethno-linguist population.157 One example Russia cited
occurred in the aftermath of President Yanukovych’s escape from
Ukraine. The Ukrainian Parliament sought to repeal the 2012 language
law that permitted Ukrainian regions to make Russia an official second
language. However, a controversy over language rights does not seem to
be the case for an armed humanitarian intervention, particularly in light
of the principles of necessity and proportionality required for such a use
of force.158 Moreover, the acting Ukraine President Turchynov declined
to sign the act or approve of the Parliament’s decision to repeal the
language law.159
I. Intervention by Invitation
Moscow’s argument that intervention in Crimea was at the legal
invitation of both President Yanukovych and Prime Minister of Crimea
Sergey Aksyonov is also undermined by governing international law. On
March 3, 2014 Russia submitted a statement to the UN Security Council,
allegedly made by Yanukovych, requesting formal military aid from the
Russian Federation to help restore law and order and protect the people
of Ukraine in the aftermath of the “illegal seizure of power in Kyiv.”160
155. Transcript: Putin says Russia will protect the rights of Russians abroad, THE WASH. POST
(Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-putin-says-russia-will-protectthe-rights-of-russians-abroad/2014/03/18/432a1e60-ae99-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html.
156. Allison, supra note 130, at 1262.
157. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 144, at
21. See also Developing Situation in Crimea alarming, says OSCE High Commissioner on
National Minorities, supra note 143.
158. Allison, supra note 130.
159. See Antonello Tancredi, The Russian annexation of the Crimea: questions relating to the
use of force, QUESTIONS OF INT’L L. (QIL) 5-34 (2014), http://www.qil-qdi.org/the-russianannexation-of-the-crimea-questions-relating-to-the-use-of-force.
160. See Grant, supra note 1, at 50.
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The statement goes on to explain that “safety and human rights are under
threat” and that “people are being persecuted on political and linguistic
grounds.”161 This requires an analysis of whether President Yanukovych
or Sergey Aksyonov had the legal standing to request such aid, and
whether the Ukrainian Constitution would allow it, even if the request
was legitimate.
It is true that President Yanukovych’s sudden departure from
Ukraine is perhaps of questionable legitimacy. While he did abandon
office and record an official statement of resignation, upon reaching
safety outside of Ukraine he retracted his resignation and declared the
Parliament vote that ousted him illegal.162 Three hundred and twentyeight members of the 450 seat parliament voted to remove Yanukovych,
for reasons including his abandonment of his post and the high volume
of deaths amassed in the Euromaidan protests.163 However, the February
22, 2014 vote may not have been legal under constitutional guidelines
that required a three-fourths majority (i.e., 338 votes) and a review by the
Constitutional Court.164 In any event, the constitutionality of his
impeachment does not alone provide a basis for the use of military force
in Crimea. Although the requirements for a government to issue a valid
invitation to use force are not codified in international law, State practice
and customary international law indicate that “effective control over a
substantial area” is required for the inviting government.165
International recognition is another factor to be considered, and
Yanukovych’s claim of legitimacy rests purely on the recognition of the
State that intervened. The majority of the international community
recognizes the transitional government in Kiev.166 Generally, it has been
thought that recognition of the “intervening State alone usually cannot
suffice to legalize or justify and intervention.”167 This can be seen in UN
General Assembly Resolution 44/240 denouncing the US intervention in
Panama.168 There, the US similarly tried to justify that its invitation to
use force was at the behest of Guillermo Endara, who was only
recognized by the US as the legitimate President of Panama and was in

161. Id.
162. Daisy Sindelar, Was Yanukovych’s Ouster Constitutional?, RADIO FREE EUR., (Feb. 23,
2014), http://www.rferl.org/content/was-yanukovychs-ouster-constitutional/25274346.html.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Grant, supra note 1, at 51.
166. Tancredi, supra note 154, at 3; See also Harding, supra note 99.
167. Tancredi, supra note 154, at 3.
168. Id.
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exile on a US military base.169 It therefore appears that an invitation from
a recognized interim government would be considered much more
legitimate than the statements of a single deposed leader in exile
recognized only by the intervening State.
There are some scholars who believe a government “in exile could
in some limited circumstances validly invite foreign troops onto the
territory of their State despite having been deprived of effective
control.”170 Such a case would require the sitting government to be
recognized internationally as illegal.171 For example, the legitimate
Government of Kuwait, while in exile, was not deprived of its right to
request foreign assistance against Iraq as an aggressor in 1990.172 There,
however, Kuwait’s government was recognized by a majority of the
international community and the UN as the legitimate representative of
its country.173 In contrast, the transitional Kiev government was not a
forceful imposition by an outside power nor has it been found to
persistently violate human rights.174 The majority of human rights
violations found by the OHCHR Report, in fact, occurred under President
Yanukvoych’s regime during the Euromaidan protests.175 After the Kiev
regime change, there was no widespread international support
recognizing Yanukovych as the legitimate government authority.176
The US was also quick to dismiss the legality of Sergey Aksyonov’s
request for intervention, stating that “the prohibition of the use of force
would be rendered moot were sub-national authorities able to unilaterally
invite military intervention by a neighboring state.”177 International law
only recognizes the ability of regional governments to invite the use of
military force in very limited situations, and in those situations the
“author of an invitation…must be the highest available State organ in
order to ensure that the state speaks with one voice.”178 Further evidence
of Aksyonov’s request being illegitimate can be found in the ICJ’s
Nicaragua judgment. The court noted that “…it is difficult to see what
would remain of the principle of non-intervention in international law if
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 144.
See also Developing Situation in Crimea alarming, says OSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities, supra note 143.
176. See Harding, supra note 99.
177. See Allison, supra note 130.
178. See Tancredi, supra note 154.
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intervention, which is already allowable at the request of the government
of a State, were also to be allowed at the request of the opposition.”179
This undermines any legitimacy of a regional government’s invitation to
use force.
J. Coup d’état/ Rebus Sic Stantibus
Yet another popular Kremlin argument accuses the Euromaidan
protests of being an illegal Western-backed coup d’état of the
democratically elected regime under President Yanukovych.180 Under
this theory, Russia recognizes the fundamental change of circumstances,
or rebus sic santibus, provision articulated in Article 62 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) allowing for a reexamination
of obligations rising from previously conducted treaties, accords, and
international agreements between Russia and Ukraine.181 Putin claims
that the US “helped train the nationalists, their armed groups in Western
Ukraine…” and that the West “facilitated the armed coup.”182 Thus, the
interim government was illegal and Yanukovych remained the legal
president of Ukraine. The argument then follows that all Russian treaties
with Ukraine were void since they had been conducted with prior
legitimate putative State authorities, including the bilateral friendship
treaties prohibiting violations of territorial sovereignty. The problem
with this argument is that VCLT Art. 62(2) articulates that a
“fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground
for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty (a) if the treaty establishes
a boundary;…”183 Thus, a fundamental change of circumstances
argument could not void the validity of the Budapest Memorandum,
Helsinki Final Act, the bilateral Treaty of Friendship, or the Black Sea
Fleet agreement, all of which emphasize respect of Ukraine’s borders and
territory.
K. Kosovo, Iraq, and Libya
Moscow has also referred to the ICJ decision regarding Kosovo and
recent State practice in both Iraq and Libya as precedent for the March

179. Id.
180. See Alex Christoforou, New Documentary Shows Kiev Coup through Putin’s Eyes, RUSS.
INSIDER (Mar. 16, 2015), http://russia-insider.com/en/2015/03/15/4505.
181. See Mamlyuk, supra note 131.
182. See Christoforou, supra note 175.
183. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 62(2), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
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2014 use of force resulting in the annexation of Crimea.184 While the
advisory opinion from the ICJ acknowledged Kosovo’s declared
independence from Serbia legal, it evaded the question of whether the
Kosovo population could secede as a manifestation of their right to selfdetermination. Putin has stated that the 2010 ICJ opinion on Kosovo was
“a very similar situation” to the events that unfolded in Crimea.185 Like
Crimea, Kosovo was an autonomous republic composed of a majority of
citizens who belonged to an ethnic minority. The Kosovo Albanians
feared Serbian oppression, as did (so the argument goes) ethnic Russians
living in Crimea of the interim Kiev government.186 Under further
examination, however, differences between the situations are quite stark.
First, it should be noted that Russia vehemently opposed the
recognition of Kosovo and the ICJ decision. Russia claimed the
declaration of independence from Serbia violated the UN Charter
ensuring the territorial integrity of member nations and any recognition
of Kosovo supported separatism.187 In fact, Russia issued a Written
Statement in the Kosovo Advisory Proceedings, as follows:
“[T]he Russian Federation is of the view that [international law] may
be construed as authorizing secession under certain conditions.
However, those conditions should be limited to truly extreme
circumstances, such as an outright attack by the parent State,
threatening the very existence of the people in question. Otherwise, all
efforts should be taken in order to settle the tension between the parent
State and the ethnic community concerned within the framework of
the existing State.”188

It does not appear Russia took all efforts to “settle the tension
between the parent State and the ethnic community” in Crimea, as they
rushed to conduct a referendum in the immediate aftermath of regime
change without counseling the UN Security Council or other international
governing bodies.189 The argument embracing territorial integrity of UN
184. Putin, supra note 91.
185. See Ilya Somin, Why the Kosovo “precedent” does not justify Russia’s annexation of
Crimea, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/03/24/crimea-kosovo-and-false-moral-equivalency.
186. See Daniel W. Drezner, Putin’s excuse for a referendum is wrong: Crimea isn’t Kosovo –
at all, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2014/mar/17/putin-referendum-crimea-kosovo.
187. See Steve Gutterman, Russia Denounces Kosovo Declaration, WASH. POST (Feb. 17,
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/17/AR2008021700714.
html.
188. Anna Stepanowa, International Law on Legality of the Crimea Secession, BEYOND THE
EU (Apr. 15, 2014), http://beyondthe.eu/international-law-crimea-secession.
189. Id.; Grant, supra note 1, at 57.
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member nations and anti-separatism fly in the very face of the rhetoric
Moscow uses to legitimize the separation of Crimea. Further, there has
been little, if any, evidence of “truly extreme circumstances,” such as
severe human rights abuses in Crimea, at least nowhere near the scale of
what existed in Kosovo in the late 1990s.190
Second, Crimea sought independence under the guise of following
the Ukrainian Constitution, which explicitly prohibits any binding
territory-altering referendum that was not held nation-wide.191 However,
Kosovo was entitled under the 1974 constitution of Yugoslavia with the
right to secession.192 For instance, “[t]his right was exercised in a 1992
referendum with a majority opting for secession and independence.”193 In
response, Serbia did not recognize the vote and a campaign of violence
and persecution ensued.194 From the time of NATO’s intervention in
1999, it took eight whole years for independence to be declared.195
During that period, Kosovo was under the administration of the UN and
negotiations for a resolution were both peaceful and internationally
supervised.196 Russia took a period of mere days and weeks to deploy
stationed troops throughout Crimea, hold a dubious referendum under
said military presence, and then formally annexed the territory.197 The
UN Security Council vote on the legitimacy of the referendum was then
vetoed by Russia, and the General Assembly voted 100-11 denouncing
the action.198
Third, the human rights abuses perpetuated against the Kosovars by
Serbia were well documented.199 In 1998, the UN Security Council in
Resolution 1199 acknowledged “excessive and indiscriminate use of
force” by Serbia and the Yugoslav Army, resulting in “numerous civilian
casualties” and the “displacement of over 230,000 persons from their

190. See generally Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra
note 144; See also Developing Situation in Crimea alarming, says OSCE High Commissioner on
National Minorities, supra note 143.
191. UKR. CONST., supra note 112, art. 73.
192. George Topouria, Three Reasons Why Crimea Is Not Kosovo, BEYOND THE EU (Mar. 17,
2014), http://beyondthe.eu/crimea-definitely-not-kosovo.
193. Topouria, supra note 187.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Backing Ukraine’s territorial integrity, UN Assembly declares Crimea referendum
invalid, UN NEWS CENTRE (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?
NewsID=47443#.Vle6x9AqhAQ.
199. IVANA NIZICH, YUGOSLAVIA: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN KOSOVO 1990-1992 (Oct. 1,
1992), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1992/yugoslavia.
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homes.”200 Russia voted in favor of this resolution, as did other Western
members of the Council.201 However, there is neither evidence of
numerous civilian casualties of the Crimean people perpetuated by the
interim government in Kiev, nor evidence of the displacement of
hundreds of thousands from their homes.202 Thus, while on the surface
the two conflicts may share some basic characteristics, they are in reality
quite different. The Russian attempt to use Western support for Kosovo’s
independence is contrary to not only Moscow’s views regarding the case
at the time, but does not appear to hold up as valid precedent based on the
principles the opinion set down.
Russia has also referred to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the
2011 UN Security Council Resolution of 1973, which formed the basis
for military intervention in the Libyan Civil War, to justify their
actions.203 While these two conflicts were perhaps the most similar in
their justifications to the conflict in Crimea, it is only because all three
have been condemned as abuses of international law. The 2003 invasion
of Iraq was perpetuated by the US without explicit approval of the UN
Security Council, and was denounced as a violation of the UN Charter by
then UN secretary general Kofi Annan.204 In March 2011, the UN
Security Council approved a ‘no-fly zone’ over Libya and authorized ‘all
necessary measures’ to protect civilians, with a vote of ten in favor to
none against, with five abstaining (including Russia).205 Despite the
concern for human rights in Libya, Putin called the resolution “flawed
and inadequate,” because it allowed States to “take any action against a
sovereign state.”206 At the time, it appeared he favored territorial
sovereignty over humanitarian concerns.207 Yet when the argument is
tailored to Crimea, Moscow appears to be comfortable with using the
Western rhetoric it had decried just years ago. Perhaps, in the early
2000’s, it should have been foreseen that Western interventions under
200. S.C. Res. 1199, (Sept. 23, 1998), http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/site7423/general/
documents/unscr1199.pdf.
201. Id.
202. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 144. See
also Developing Situation in Crimea alarming, says OSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities, supra note 143.
203. Putin, Address at the Kremlin, supra note 91.
204. Eqen MacAskill & Julian Borger, Iraq war was illegal and breached UN charter, says
Annan, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 15, 2004), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/
sep/16/iraq.iraq.
205. Security Council Approves ‘No Fly Zone’ Over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary
Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions, U.N. Doc. SC/10200
(Mar. 17, 2011), https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm.
206. Pacer, supra note 132.
207. Id.
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dubious international law principles could have potential repercussions
in the form of Russian mimicry.
While the foregoing two examples of State practice are a minimal
basis for Russia bypassing UN support for use of force in Crimea, the
majority of Moscow’s legal rhetoric appears to be flawed. In light of the
multitude of UN doctrines and international agreements that support the
territorial sovereignty of Ukraine and undermine the legitimacy of
Crimea’s secession to Russia, combined with the minimal legitimacy
shown to underscore Russia’s central legal arguments justifying use of
force, the conclusion appears to be clear. Russia’s military deployment
in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in late February and early March
2014 was an illegal use of force, while the March referendum and ensuing
annexation was an illegitimate political act and a violation of Ukraine’s
territorial sovereignty.
III. CONFLICT IN THE DONBAS
A. Background
On April 6, 2014, just weeks after the annexation, armed men seized
administration and security-service buildings in Donetsk, Luhansk, and
Kharkiv, the three capitals of Ukraine’s eastern provinces.208 Within
days, police and security-service buildings were overtaken by
unidentified armed soldiers, local armed separatists, and regular
civilians.209 As a result of the last three years of armed conflict between
Ukraine’s government forces and the separatist militias, the UN estimates
there have been over 9,000 casualties and between 2 and 3.5 million
people displaced.210 Moreover, the fighting has seen violent peaks with
quiet ceasefires, two failed peace agreements, and a multitude of
accusations levied by both sides.
The style of conflict Russia has perpetuated has been referred to as
a “hybrid war” in Ukraine, via the proxy separatist forces in Donetsk and
Luhansk, commonly referred to as the Donbas region of Ukraine.211
208. Boys from the blackstuff, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.economist.com/
news/briefing/21601048-government-kiev-has-no-obvious-counters-russian-inspiredoccupations-industrial.
209. Id.
210. Adrian Bonenburger, The War No One Notices in Ukraine, THE NEW YORK TIMES (June
20, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/opinion/ukraine-russia.html; see also U.N.
Report, Escalation of hostilities has exacerbated civilian suffering, OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN RIGHTS (March 15, 2017) http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21383&LangID=E.
211. Andrew Tilghman & Oriana Pawlyk, U.S. vs. Russia: What a war would look like between
the world’s most feared militaries, MILITARY TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.militarytimes.com/
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“Hybrid war” attempts to encapsulate a modern style of conflict,
involving a mix of “non-state proxy fighters, heavy armor and artillery,
drones, electronic warfare, and aggressive information operations” used
by Russia to achieve tactical battlefield victories and broader political
objectives.212 On December 1, 2015, NATO adopted a new hybrid
warfare strategy in response to Russia’s actions in Crimea, but has yet to
address the more violent, aggressive military action in the Donbas.213
The term “hybrid warfare” does not necessarily represent a new
ideology to Soviet or Russian foreign policy escapades. For instance,
maskirovka was a staple of Soviet military doctrine with its principal
features including the maintenance of plausible deniability, concealment
of forces, disinformation, denial, and decoy actions to confuse the
opponents’ ability to predict and respond to actions.214 Additionally, the
use of modern technology and strategy in connection with maskirovka
has created a difficult to define style of conflict. This style of warfare
was foreshadowed by Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine and in the 2014
iteration. The doctrines include provisions for “integrated utilization of
forces and resources of a non-military character,” “measures of
information warfare in order to achieve political objectives,”
“participation of irregular armed force elements and private military
companies,” and the “use of indirect and asymmetric methods of
operations.”215 These tactical strategies presaged today’s use of the term
“hybrid war,” while outlining a path for Russia to perpetuate a violent
geopolitical crisis without the attachment of direct responsibility for
instigating an international armed conflict.
While the conflict is most commonly characterized as a noninternational armed conflict, this section will show that between August
2014 and January 2015, Russian involvement crossed the threshold of
being an illegal use of force and initiated an international armed conflict.
216
The situation in the Donbas is distinct from the situation in Crimea
story/military/2015/10/05/us-russia-vladimir-putin-syria-ukraine-american-militaryplans/73147344.
212. Id.
213. Mark Rachkevych, NATO adopts counter ‘hybrid warfare’ strategy, prompted by Russia’s
asymmetry and hostility toward Ukraine, KYIV POST (Dec. 1, 2015, 11:31 PM),
https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/war-against-ukraine/nato-adopts-counter-hybridwarfare-strategy-prompted-by-russias-asymmetric-hostility-toward-ukraine-403274.html.
214. Pierre Vaux, Provocations, Proxies and Plausible Deniability, THE INTERPRETER (June
24, 2014), http://www.interpretermag.com/provocations-proxies-and-plausible-deniability.
215. Michael Kofman & Matthew Rojansky, A Closer Look at Russia’s “Hybrid War”, 7
KENNAN
CABLE
(Apr.
2015),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/7KENNAN%20CABLE-ROJANSKY%20KOFMAN.pdf.
216. Red Cross officially declares Ukraine civil war, supra note 5.
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because the territory is larger, pro-Moscow support is not as widespread,
and there are no major local Russian military hubs. Conversely, Crimea
was a well-defined territory, contained a Russian military base which
housed troops, and was made up of 77% Russian speaking citizens and
58% ethnic Russians.217 The separatists only control portions of two
Donbas oblasts, but neither in their entirety. The ethnic population is
more diverse and there are no Russian bases in Ukraine’s sovereign
territory. Russia’s documented and alleged military involvement in the
Donbas will be analyzed below. This section will show that the conflict
should be characterized as an International Armed Conflict between
Russia and Ukraine with a parallel Non-International Armed Conflict
between Ukraine and the pro-Russian separatists.
B. Turning Points of Russian Involvement
The Donbas separatist movement began as a combination of
Ukrainian pro-Russian local activists and volunteer Russian militants
active in the region.218 Local leaders were younger men who had been
active in Russian nationalist groups in eastern Ukraine.219 Russian
militants began arriving after the annexation of Crimea, and were often
older, more experienced Russian military veterans who developed a
working relationship with the younger radicals.220 For example, the
Donetsk People’s Republic was proclaimed in April 2014 by ‘President’
Aleksander Bordai, a Russian political consultant from Moscow, and his
Defense Minister, Igor “Strelkgov” Girkin.221 The EU believes that
Girkin works for Russian military intelligence, GRU, and has ties to prior
Russian military service in Chechnya, Serbia, and Transnistria. Girkin is
now considered the commander-in-chief of both the DPR and LPR, and
has claimed responsibility for igniting the separatist movement with his
military unit in April 2014.222 Russia believed that by providing

217. See Hashem Said, Map: Russian language dominant in Crimea, AL-JAZEERA (Mar. 15,
2014, 9:24 PM ET), http://america.aljazeera.com/multimedia/2014/3/map-russian-thedominantlanguageincrimea.html.
218. See Ukraine crisis: Key players in eastern unrest, BBC NEWS (Aug. 28, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-27211501.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See Ukraine crisis: Key players in eastern unrest, BBC NEWS (Aug. 28, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-27211501.
222. See Anna Dolgov, Russia’s Igor Strelkov: I Am Responsible for War in Eastern Ukraine,
THE MOSCOW TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russias-igorstrelkov-i-am-responsible-for-war-in-eastern-ukraine/511584.html.
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leadership, funding, and ammunition, local rebellions would thrive in
destabilizing Kiev.223
In April and May 2014, the separatist operation saw early success
while the Kiev government was still in transition.224 On May 25, 2014,
elections were held and the newly-elected President Poroshenko was
sworn in June 7, 2014.225 Throughout the summer, Poroshenko began to
ramp up Ukraine’s military operations against the separatists.226
Consequently, Ukraine forces found success against the ill-equipped
separatist militias and by mid-August 2014 had nearly encircled the
remaining separatist enclaves in Donetsk and Luhansk.227
At this point, the Kremlin stepped in to assist. The Donetsk People’s
Republic announced in August 2014 they had received 30 tanks, 120
armored vehicles, and 1,200 troops from across the Russian border.228
According to President Poroshenko and NATO satellite imagery,
“columns of heavy artillery, huge loads of arms and regular Russian
servicemen came to the territory of Ukraine from Russia through
uncontrolled border areas.”229 Yet Russia continued to deny any Russian
military presence in the region.230
The bloodiest battle of 2014 was concluded on August 29 in the
strategic city of Ilovaisk. Ukraine troops had successfully beaten back
separatists in nearby areas, and the assault was supposed to be the final
drive to secure the city, which would cut crucial supply lines between the
rebels of Donetsk and Russia’s border where support was flowing from.231
There were approximately 100 separatists expected to remain in the
city.232 Several days into the assault, an unexpectedly forceful counter-

223. See generally Id.
224. See generally Id.
225. See Timeline: Ukraine’s poltical crisis, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 19, 2014),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/03/timeline-ukraine-political-crisis201431143722854652.html.
226. Id.
227. See Max Fisher, 30 tanks and 1,200 troops just crossed from Russia into Ukraine,
according to the rebels, VOX (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.vox.com/2014/8/16/6023605/30-tanksand-1200-troops-just-crossed-from-russia-into-ukraine.
228. Id.
229. See Michael R. Gordon, Ukraine Leader Says ‘Huge Loads of Arms’ Pour in from Russia,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/world/europe/ukraineconflict.html.
230. Melinda Haring, Putin Cracks Down on U.S. Press Reporting Russian Involvement in
Ukraine, NEWSWEEK (Jun. 25, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/putin-cracks-down-us-pressreporting-russian-involvement-ukraine-346926.
231. See Dan Peleschuk, Ukraine is still at war – and its bloodiest battle isn’t over, THE WK.
(Sept. 2, 2015), http://theweek.com/articles/574972/ukraine-still-war—bloodiest-battle-isnt-over.
232. Id.
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attack shocked the Ukraine troops. Reports from the government forces
show that 4,000 Russian infantry members had crossed the border, about
half of which were heading to Ilovaisk.233 It was not a complete surprise,
as Ukrainian forces had captured ten Russian paratroopers and a Russian
tank throughout the course of the battle.234 However, the Russian forces
and separatist rebels gradually surrounded the now-outnumbered
Ukrainians, forcing a negotiation for safe passage back to Ukraine-held
territory. While the content of these talks has been disputed, what
followed from them has not. When the column of approximately four
hundred Ukrainians waited to leave through a corridor outside the city, a
rebel commander warned over radio communications that they would
soon meet their deaths.235
As the Ukrainian troop convoy began to exit the city and reached an
open field to the south, they came upon Russian tanks and buried artillery
that began to fire upon them at will. 236 Surviving Ukrainians were taken
into Russian custody and passed to the rebels days later.237 Ukraine
estimates that around 100 men were killed that day in the retreat.
According to Ukraine’s military prosecutor, 366 troops were killed in
total in the Battle of Ilovaisk (a number thought to be conservative.)238
Russia denies any direct involvement with the battle, and claimed the
captured paratroops had crossed the border by accident.239
The Russian escalation prompted additional sanctions from the EU
and spawned the Minsk Peace talks in early September, 2014.
Representatives of the Ukrainian and Russian governments, separatist
leaders, and a representative of the OSCE signed a ceasefire.240 Despite
this, reports indicated continued heavy weaponry entering east
Ukraine.241 A military operation seizing Donetsk Airport from Ukrainian
forces in December was indicative of the rising violence between the
forces. In the middle of January 2015, a critical battle broke out for the

233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See 366 Ukrainian fighters killed in Battle for Ilovaisk last August: Military, UKR. TODAY
(Aug. 5, 2015), http://uatoday.tv/politics/battle-for-ilovaisk-one-year-on-469594.html.
239. See Peleschuk, supra note 222.
240. See History of War in Ukraine, UKR. UNDER ATTACK, http://ukraineunderattack.org/
en/history-of-conflict (last visited Nov. 2015).
241. See Laura Smith-Spark, Diana Magnay & Reza Sayah, Artillery barrages in southern
Ukraine raise questions on ceasefire, CNN.COM (Sept. 6, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/
2014/09/06/world/europe/ukraine-crisis.
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railway hub of Debaltseve that lies between Donetsk and Luhansk.242
Following a substantial Russian resupply of forces, the separatists were
able to defend the city against Ukrainian troops.243 The violent skirmishes
inspired a second round of peace talks, Minsk II, which called for a
ceasefire to come into effect on February 15, 2015.244 While the ceasefire
brought relief to some eastern Ukraine frontlines, the DPR rebel leaders
announced that it did not apply to Debaltseve, and continued their
shelling of thousands of trapped government troops until they were able
to retreat.245
While separatist soldiers did take part in the Battle of Debaltseve,
documented evidence of Russian troops and powerful weaponry suggests
both were pivotal factors in the fight.246 This included the 5th Tank
Brigade from the Russian Ulan-Ude, Buryatia province and the 37th
Motorized Infantry Brigade from Kyakhta, Buryatia.247 One soldier from
the 5th Tank Brigade, Dorzhi Batomunkuyev, gave an interview with a
Russian independent newspaper that contract soldiers from Kyakhta had
joined him when crossing the border to fight in Debaltseve.248 Another
Russia soldier, Bato Dambayev, trained with the 37th Motorized Infantry
Brigade in the Russian Kuzminsky camp in December and January,
crossed over the border with his brigade to fight battles in Debaltseve,
and then returned home after the victory.249 A third Russian citizen and
twenty-five year-old who has served multiple military terms with Russian
forces, joined the separatists as a volunteer in 2014.250 In an interview
with Radio Free Europe, he estimated that each separatist unit “has some
15 volunteers from Russia” fighting for it.251 He also said that regular

242. See Karoun Demirjian, Ukranian Battalion’s soldiers recall desperate run to safety,
WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/these-ukrainiansoldiers-tell-a-vivid-story-of-escaping-rebel-noose/2015/02/18/8251fef6-b77a-11e4-bc30a4e75503948a_story.html.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See Alec Luhn, Fears for Ukraine’s ceasefire as clashes with Russia-backed rebels
intensify, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/14/
ukraine-ceasefire-doubt-clashes-rebels-russia-rockets-shelling.
246. Maksymilian Czuperski et al., Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin’s War in Ukraine, THE
ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/hidingin-plain-sight-putin-s-war-in-ukraine-and-boris-nemtsov-s-putin-war.
247. Id. See also Haring, supra note 225.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Nail Khisamiev & Merhat Sharipzhan, Volunteer Rebel Sheds Light On Russian Military
Involvement In Eastern Ukraine, RADIO FREE EUR. (Jul. 22, 2015), http://www.rferl.org/content/
ukraine-russia-military-involvement-volunteer/27144747.html.
251. Id.
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Russian troops enter the Donbas for one week periods before leaving and
being replaced by fresh forces. 252
Russian weapons systems sighted in Debaltseve include the T-72B3
Tank and the KamAZ-5350 Grad rocket launcher.253 Other Russian
manufactured arms that have ‘appeared’ in the hands of the separatist
military included shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles, anti-tank
guided missiles, landmines, and certain small arms.254 The use of
electronic warfare in Ukraine has also been effective; Russia has
effectively jammed radar, GPS, and radio communications of the Ukraine
government forces with sophisticated equipment.255
In late September 2015, the Obama administration made the
decision to send counter-battery radar for missiles to Ukraine, as longrange Russian artillery was responsible for over 80% of Ukraine’s
casualties.256 In early October, a positive meeting between French
President Hollande, Ukraine President Poroshenko, German Chancellor
Merkel, and President Putin resulted in the suspension of local elections
in the DNR and LNR enclaves until January 2016, as well as the
withdrawal of certain weaponry within fifteen kilometers from the line of
contact.257 Putin was much more willing to cooperate than when the
leaders had last met in January for the Minsk II talks in the midst of the
Debaltseve violence.258
This article was written in the fall and winter of 2015, but the war
in Donbas shows no signs of slowing down as of the three-year
anniversary of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2017. Ukrainian
Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin testified before a U.S. Senate panel in
March warning the Appropriations Committee of Russia’s hybrid warfare
tactics.259 Klimkin declared that Moscow currently has 4,200 regular
troops, 40,000 militants, over 400 tanks, and 1,000 artillery platforms
located in Eastern Ukraine.260 After a sharp escalation of hostilities at the
252. Id.
253. See Czuperski, supra note 241, at 21.
254. Id. at 11.
255. See Joe Gould, Electronic Warfare: What US Army Can Learn From Ukraine, DEF. NEWS
(Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/warfare/2015/08/02/usarmy-ukraine-russia-electronic-warfare/30913397.
256. See John Herbst, A Lull in the East, AM. INT. (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.the-americaninterest.com/2015/10/30/a-lull-in-the-east.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See Robbie Gramer, European Diplomats to Congress: For Our Sake, Don’t Cut Foreign
Aid Funding, FOREIGN POLICY, (March 8, 2017), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/08/nervouseuropeans-want-more-u-s-funding-to-fend-off-russia-threat-trump-putin-relationship-nato-allieseastern-europe-ukraine-baltic-states/.
260. Id.
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end of January and beginning of February 2017, the death total for the
conflict has now reached nearly 10,000, with over 23,000 people
injured.261 This death total includes over 2,000 civilians.262
C. Law of Armed Conflict
There are two types of armed conflicts defined in international
humanitarian law. The first is an international armed conflict (IAC),
defined by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (except common Article
3) and 1977 Additional Protocol I.263 Common Article 2 applies the
definition to an “Armed conflict between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them.” The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC)
commentary on that provision explains that the article refers to any
“difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of
armed forces is an armed conflict…even if one of the Parties denies the
existence of a state of war.”264
Second, the main sources governing non-international armed
conflicts (NIAC) are common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and Article 1 of 1977’s Additional Protocol II.265 Common Article
3 applies to “armed conflicts not of an international character occurring
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”266 This
encompasses military conflict between armed government forces and
non-government groups, or between two such non-government groups.
However, a “threshold of confrontation” must be reached to fall under
this Article, including a level of intensity requiring the government’s use
of military force against the insurgents, as opposed to mere police forces,
and a level of organization within the command structure of the
insurgents that enables the group to sustain military operations.267
Article 1 of Additional Protocol II adopts a slightly narrower
definition of non-international armed conflict. The document applies to
261. See U.N. Report, Escalation of hostilities has exacerbated civilian suffering, OFFICE OF
HIGH COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN RIGHTS (March 15, 2017) http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21383&LangID=E.
262. Id.
263. See Qualification of Armed Conflict, RULE OF L. IN ARMED CONFLICTS PROJECT,
http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/qualification_of_armed_conflict.php (last visited Dec.
2015).
264. See International Committee of the Red Cross Opinion Paper, How is the Term “Armed
Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law? (Mar. 2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng/
assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
THE
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armed conflicts “which take place in the territory of a High Contracting
party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other
organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations…”268 The definition is more
restrictive because it requires an element of territorial control, and
expressly applies to armed conflicts between State armed forces and
dissident armed forces.
D. Application in the Donbas
While the ICRC has declared the conflict in the Donbas to be a
NIAC, other international bodies such as Amnesty International have
declared it to be an IAC between Russia and Ukraine.269 While the hybrid
war strategy allows the Russian government to continue to deny its
involvement in the conflict, under the laws of war the NIAC in eastern
Ukraine appears to have escalated into a parallel IAC in August 2014 and
January 2015.270
During the spring and summer of 2014, the conflict should have
been characterized as a Protocol II NIAC. While the common Article 3
definition also applied because of the deployment of Ukraine’s military
forces and the command structure and military hierarchy within the
separatist forces, the Protocol II definition was better suited because of
the territorial control the rebels maintained. They took control of both
administration buildings and military installations, as well as strategic
highways, railroads, and airports.271 Their army was organized under a
military hierarchy, with multiple battalions led by Russian military
veterans such as the lead commander Igor Girkin.272 It therefore appears
that the elements of territorial control and organized dissident armed
forces satisfied a Protocol II definition.
The August 2014 and February 2015 resupply of weapons,
ammunition, military support vehicles, and troops combined with the
available evidence from the Battle of Illovaisk and Debaltseve escalated
the conflict to an IAC. The threshold for IAC is relatively low, and the
inclusion or presence of any Russian soldiers fighting with or leading
268. Id.
269. See Ukraine: Mounting evidence of war crimes and Russian involvement, AMNESTY INT’L
(Sept. 7, 2014), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/09/ukraine-mounting-evidencewar-crimes-and-russian-involvement. See also Red Cross officially declares Ukraine civil war,
supra note 5.
270. See Haring, supra note 221.
271. See generally Czuperski, supra note 241.
272. Id. See generally also Dolgov, supra note 217.
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rebels against the Ukrainian government forces would create a parallel
IAC between Ukraine and Russia, in addition to the NIAC between
Ukraine and the rebels.273 The common Article 2 definition would apply
if there was any evidence of Russian soldiers present and fighting in the
conflict, as the definition includes intervention of “members of the armed
forces” of another State (emphasis added).274 As shown through
interviews and investigative reports, there is ample evidence that
members of the Russian armed forces are participating in the armed
conflict.
In the case against Bosnian-Serb Dusko Tadic, the International
Criminal Tribunal ruled that an IAC would exist if one State exercised
“overall control” over forces that go beyond the “mere financing and
equipping of such forces” to include “participation in the planning and
supervision of military operations.”275 There is ample evidence of Russia
providing arms, troops and financial assistance to the rebels, however
little evidence exists to determine whether Russian authorities are directly
planning operations.276 Yet Putin has shown that he maintains heavy
influence over the separatist leaders, and has wielded this influence to
postpone local elections and withdraw certain weaponry.277 While this
does not conclusively determine any military operational planning, it
does support an inference of control that goes beyond mere financing and
equipping of the separatist forces. Someone high up the chain of Russian
military command had to order the troop movements of the 5th Tank
Brigade, the 37th Motorized Infantry Brigade, and others from the
Russian military camp Kuzminsky; and it would follow that whomever
did was participating ‘in the planning and supervision of military
operations.’
Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and guiding principles of the
1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the
273. International Armed Conflict Classification, RULAC Geneva Academy (July 13, 2017)
http://www.rulac.org/classification/international-armed-conflict#collapse1accord; Ilya Nuzov &
Anne Quintin, The Case of Russia’s Detention of Ukrainian Military Pilot Savchenko under IHL,
EUR. J. INT’L. L.: TALK! (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-case-of-russias-detention-ofukrainian-military-pilot-savchenko-under-ihl.
274. See International Committee of the Red Cross Opinion Paper, supra note 256.
275. Id.
276. See Ukraine: Mounting evidence of war crimes and Russian involvement, supra note 261.
See also Jonathon Ferguson & N.R. Jenzen-Jones, Raising Red Flags: An Examination of Arms &
Munitions in the Ongoing Conflict in Ukraine, ARMAMENT RES. SERVICES (Nov. 2014),
http://armamentresearch.com/Uploads/Research%20Report%20No.%203%20%20Raising%20Red%20Flags.pdf.
277. See Herbst, supra note 238.
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Charter of the United Nations, these actions also constitute an illegal use
of force that is contrary to peaceful values indoctrinated in international
law. Article 2(4)’s prohibition of the “use of force against…the political
independence” of another State was further clarified in the 1970 nonbinding resolution, which prohibited “any attempt aimed at the partial or
total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a State.”278
The combination of Russian soldiers, advanced weaponry, and military
equipment that has been documented in eastern Ukraine appears to be an
attempt to disrupt the national unity and political independence of
Ukraine.279 While the postponing of the separatist elections was an
important diplomatic achievement, it has created a frozen quagmire in the
Donbas that Putin is counting on to destabilize Poroshenko’s pro-Western
regime. The conflict has made it impossible for the Poroshenko
administration to effectively govern, particularly in a country that was
already in need of economic and regulatory reform.
IV. CONCLUSION
While these conflicts are quite distinct in nature, they both reinforce
a theme of Russia interpreting international law however it sees fit,
manipulating and ignoring whichever tenants may be inconvenient to
their national security strategy without any fear of legal consequence or
repercussion. Although Western democracies have not been models of
excellence in following international law while waging complex wars
against supranational terrorist regimes, this does not give Putin legal carte
blanche to ‘fix’ what he considers “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe”
of the 20th century: the demise of the Soviet Union.280 As Russia
continues to display a willingness to magnify its military influence
throughout regions of global significance, it is vital for the West to
continue to protect the Baltic, Eastern Europe, and in particular,
Ukraine’s democratic interest and desire for integration and reform in the
face of perpetual Kremlin interference.
The deployment of a combination of unmarked Russian military
throughout the Crimean peninsula on the eve of an illegally proffered
political referendum amounts to several violations of governing

278. UN Charter, art. 2, para. 4, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf. See
also Sayapin, supra note 69, at 23.
279. See Ukraine: Mounting evidence of war crimes and Russian involvement, supra note 261.
See also Czuperski, supra note 241.
280. See Putin: Soviet collapse a ‘genuine tragedy’, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 25, 2005, 2:30
PM ET), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7632057/ns/world_news/t/putin-soviet-collapse-genuinetragedy/#.VnIrm9B5xAR.
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international treaties, agreements, constitutions, and customary
international law principles. The Kremlin’s current transparency about
the military operation in Crimea stems from its success, yet due to the
uncertain future of the violent overthrow of Ukraine’s Donbas by Russian
troops and separatist forces, there is much less transparency and more
room for plausible deniability from Russia. Yet through the knowledge
gathered from journalists on the ground and supranational organizations,
it is apparent that the conflict is no longer solely a non-international
armed conflict. Russia has become an aggressor, perpetuating an
international armed conflict against Ukraine through a mixture of
strategic 21st century tactics, maskirovka, and hybrid warfare. Europe
must continue to strive to protect those who yearn for peaceful reform
and democracy in Ukraine, while allowing it to retain a national culture
that has only been allowed to flourish as a free nation so ephemerally in
its rich, complex, and viciously violent history.

